American University International Law Review
Volume 22 | Issue 5

Article 2

2007

Personal Data Privacy Tradeoffs and How A
Swedish Church Lady, Austrian Public Radio
Employees, and Transatlantic Air Carriers Show
That Europe Does Not Have The Answers
Edward C. Harris

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Harris, Edward C. "Personal Data Privacy Tradeoffs and How A Swedish Church Lady, Austrian Public Radio Employees, and
Transatlantic Air Carriers Show That Europe Does Not Have The Answers." American University International Law Review 22, no. 5
(2007): 709-743.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

WHO'S AFRAID OF THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS? TREATY INTERPRETATION
IN THE WAKE OF HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD
ANTHONY CLARK AREND*

I. THE COMMON ARTICLE 3 CONTROVERSY AND
H A M DA N ..............................................................................
7 13
A. THE POSITION OF THE ADMINISTRATION ........................... 713
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE IN HAMDAN ................ 716
C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S DECISION FOR
TREATY INTERPRETATION ................................................ 721
II. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE ON TREATY
IN TERPRETA TION .............................................................
722
A. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES ..... 722
B. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON TREATY
INTERPRETATION .............................................................

725

III. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SEPARATION OF
P O W ER S ...............................................................................
730
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................... 739
In its landmark decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,' the United
States Supreme Court rejected the Bush Administration's
interpretation of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.' Common Article 3-so called because it is common to
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1. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2764 (2006).
2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3116-18,
75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32-34 [hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the
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all four Geneva Conventions-establishes certain minimum
standards of treatment for detainees and others in "case[s] of armed
conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties." 3 Since the events of September
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3320-22, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 8688 [hereinafter Geneva 1I]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 13638 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518-20, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, 288-90 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
3. Common Article 3 provides in full:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(I) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat
by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances
be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and
in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present
Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of
the Parties to the conflict.
Geneva I, supra note 2, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-18, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32-34; Geneva
II, supra note 2, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 320-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86-88; Geneva LII,
supra note 2, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38; Geneva IV,
supra note 2, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90.
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11, 2001 and the beginning of the so-called Global War on Terror,
the Bush Administration had argued that this provision of the
Conventions did not apply to the war with al Qaeda because that war
was "of an international character."4 In Hamdan, however, the Court
explicitly rejected this interpretation and concluded that the
requirements of Common Article 3 did, in fact, apply to al Qaeda.5 In
essence, the Court rejected the notion that the President's
interpretation of a treaty was dispositive.
The Administration, however, did not take the Supreme Court's
decision as the final word on the interpretation of the Geneva
Conventions. Following heated debates about the proper legislative
response to the Hamdan decision, Congress adopted the Military
Commissions Act of 2006.6 While one of the main purposes of this
Act was to establish a statutory basis for creating military
commissions to try detainees,7 the Act also addressed questions
relating to the interpretation of the Geneva Conventions. First, the
Act claims to provide a statutory definition of what would constitute
a "grave breach" of Common Article 3.8 Second, the Act claims that
"[n]o foreign or international source of law shall supply a basis for a

4. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
5. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795.
6. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
7. See id. § 3(a)(1) (specifically the subsection which will be codified at 10
U.S.C. § 948(b)) (authorizing the President to establish military commissions to
"try alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in hostilities against the United
States for violations of the law of war and other offenses").
8. Compare id. § 6(d)(l) (explaining that acts that constitute a "grave breach"
of Common Article 3 are acts of torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, performing
biological experiments, murder, mutilation or maiming, intentionally causing
serious bodily injury, rape, sexual assault or abuse, and taking hostages) with
Geneva III, supra note 2, art. 130, 6 U.S.T. at 3420, 75 U.N.T.S. at 238. Article
130 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
defines a "grave breach" as follows:
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving
any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected
by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including
biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the
hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and
regular trial prescribed in this Convention.
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rule of decision in the courts of the United States in interpreting the
prohibitions enumerated in" the section of the U.S. Code amended by
the Act that seeks to define 'grave breaches.' 9 Third, the Act asserts
that beyond the question of what constitutes "grave breaches," the
President "has the authority for the United States to interpret the
meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions"1 and
establishes a procedure for the President to issue such interpretations
by Executive Order, claiming that "[a]ny Executive Order published
under this paragraph shall be authoritative (except as to grave
breaches of common Article 3) as a matter of United States law, in
the same manner as other administrative regulations." 1
Needless to say, the many issues raised by the Hamdan decision
and the Military Commissions Act will be studied by; legal scholars
and practitioners for years to come. In the course of this examination,
one issue that requires elaboration is the Court's willingness to reject
the President's authority to provide the legally controlling
interpretation of a treaty and make itself the final arbiter of
interpretation. This aspect of the Court's ruling presents a number of
crucial questions about the relationship between the President, the
courts, and the Congress with respect to the interpretation of
international agreements.
The purpose of this article is to explore the implications of the
Hamdan decision for treaty interpretation and to make
recommendations for policy makers. Part I will explore the Common
Article 3 controversy presented in the Hamdan case and the method
of treaty interpretation employed by the Court. Part II will analyze
the Court's traditional jurisprudence on treaty interpretation in light
of accepted international law dealing with treaty interpretation. Part
III will discuss the implications of the Court's approach for the
separation of powers. Finally, Part IV will make several
recommendations for policy makers regarding the interpretation of
past and future treaties.

9. Military Commissions Act § 6(a)(2).

10. Id. § 6(a)(3)(A).

11. Id. § 6(a)(3)(C).
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I. THE COMMON ARTICLE 3 CONTROVERSY
AND HAMDAN
A. THE POSITION OF THE ADMINISTRATION

Shortly after September 11, 2001, lawyers in the Bush
Administration began struggling with the proper legal
characterization of the new Global War on Terror. As the United
States began military operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere and
persons participating in the armed conflict were detained, the
American military required guidance as to how to classify these
detainees. If the detainees were determined to be prisoners of war,
they would enjoy the full range of rights under the Geneva
Convention on Prisoners of War. 2 If not, they would be entitled to a
much more limited set of rights. 3

12. Geneva III, supra note 2, arts. 12-16, 6 U.S.T. at 3328-30, 75 U.N.T.S. at
146-48 (providing protections exclusive to prisoners of war ("POWs") beyond the
minimum protections afforded by Common Article 3).
13. The Geneva Convention on Prisoners truly offers a privileged status to
POWs. Id. Following from the basic legal principle that there is nothing per se
illegal about being a combatant, POWs are to be treated with great respect. For
example, Article 13 provides that "[p]risoners of war must at all times be
humanely treated" and "prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly
against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity."
Id. art. 13, 6 U.S.T. at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146. Article 14 provides that
"[p]risoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and
their honour." Id. art. 14, 6 U.S.T. at 3330, 75 U.N.T.S. at 148. And Article 17
makes it clear that any questioning of a POW must proceed with great deference:
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be
inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind
whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened,
insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any
kind.
Id. art. 17, 6 U.S.T. at 3332, 75 U.N.T.S. at 150. If a detainee does not qualify for
POW status, he or she does not enjoy the full guarantees provided in the
Convention. Such person would, nonetheless, be entitled to the general human
rights protections established in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, openedfor signature Dec. 16 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20 (1992), 999
U.N.T.S. 172, the Convention Against Torture, International Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec.
10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No 100-20 (1990), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT],
and other customary international legal requirements.
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In one of the first major legal opinions on the issue, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General John Yoo argued that because al Qaeda is
a non-state actor, it can not be deemed to be a party to the Geneva
Conventions and thus its members would not enjoy the rights given
to prisoners of war. But, as noted earlier, all four Geneva
Conventions contain Common Article 3, which provides, in part:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a
minimum, the following provisions:
(I) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms
and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or
wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with
respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating
and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the
executions without previous judgment
regularly constituted court, affording
guarantees which are recognized as
civilized peoples. 4

carrying out of
pronounced by a
all the judicial
indispensable by

14. Geneva I, supra note 2, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-18, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32-34;
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Thus, even if the detainees were not entitled to the full range of
protections as prisoners of war, Article 3 might seem to provide
some minimal rights to all persons detained. In the January 9, 2002
memo, Yoo argued that members of al Qaeda were not entitled to
protection under Common Article 3 because this Article was
intended to apply to internalwars, and the war with al Qaeda was, in
fact, a conflict "of international character." 11 This view was echoed,
sometimes nearly verbatim, in one of the so-called Bybee
Memoranda, authored by Assistant Attorney General for the Office
of Legal Counsel Jay Bybee on January 22, 2002.16 In light of these
memoranda, on February 7, 2002, President Bush issued a
memorandum on "Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees."'" In this memorandum, the President concluded:
I also accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice
and determine that common Article 3 of Geneva does not
apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees, because, among
other reasons, the relevant conflicts are international in scope
and common Article 3 applies only to "armed conflict not of
an international character."' 8

Geneva II, supra note 2, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 320-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86-88; Geneva
III, supra note 2, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38; Geneva IV,
supra note 2, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90.
15. John Yoo, Draft Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel
Department of Defense, re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and
Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD
TO ABU GHRAIB 38, 43-49 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
Woo argued that Common Article 3, when read together with Article 2 of the
Conventions, covers only wars between Nation States or noninternational civil
wars. Id. at 49.
16. Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President, and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of
Defense, re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees
(Jan. 22, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB,
supra note 15, at 81, 85-90.
17. George Bush, Memorandum for the Vice President, the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, Chief of Staff to the President,
Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff re: Humane Treatment of al
Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS:
THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB, supra note 15, at 134.
18. Id. at 134-35.
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In its brief submitted to the Supreme Court in Hamdan, the
Government reiterated the President's interpretation of Common
Article 3 and also told the Court that "the President's determination
is dispositive or, at a minimum, entitled to great weight."' 9 But, as
will be seen below, the Court disagreed with both the President's
interpretation of Common Article 3 and the notion that his
interpretation would be dispositive.
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE INHAMDAN

When the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decided Hamdan,0 it
ruled that the Geneva Conventions were not enforceable in U.S.
courts and even if they were, Hamdan would not be entitled to the
rights under the Convention on Prisoners of War.2 This, the D.C.
Circuit ruled, was true for two main reasons. First, Hamdan did not
fulfill the requirements under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention
that would qualify him as a prisoner of war. As the court explained:
One problem for Hamdan is that he does not fit the Article 4
definition of a "prisoner of war" entitled to the protection of
the Convention. He does not purport to be a member of a
group who displayed "a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at
a distance" and who conducted "their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war."22
Second, even if Hamdan were not entitled to the full rights
guaranteed to prisoners of war, he would also not be entitled to claim
rights under Common Article 3. The court rested this conclusion first
and foremost on the fact that the President had determined that
Common Article 3 did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda. The
court noted:
Afghanistan is a "High Contracting Party." Hamdan was
captured during hostilities there. But is the war against
terrorism in general and the war against al Qaeda in
particular, an "armed conflict not of an international
19. Brief for Respondents at 48, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006)
(No. 05-184).
20. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S.Ct. 2749
(2006).
21. Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 40-41.

22. Id. at 40 (citations omitted).
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character"? President Bush determined, in a memorandum to
the Vice President and others on February 7, 2002, that it did
not fit that description because the conflict was "international
in scope." The district court disagreed with the President's
view of Common Article 3, apparently because the court
thought we were not engaged in a separate conflict with al
Qaeda, distinct from the conflict with the Taliban. We have
difficulty understanding the court's rationale. Hamdan was
captured in Afghanistan in November 2001, but the conflict
with al Qaeda arose before then, in other regions, including
this country on September 11, 2001. Under the Constitution,
the President "has a degree of independent authority to act" in
foreign affairs, . . . and, for this reason and others, his
construction and application of treaty provisions is entitled to
"great weight." While the district court determined that the
actions in Afghanistan constituted a single conflict, 'the
President's decision to treat our conflict with the Taliban
separately from our conflict with al Qaeda is the sort of
political-military decision constitutionally committed to
him.23
And, the court continued, even if Common Article 3 were to apply
to Harmdan, his challenge should be brought after the military
commission had ruled on his case.24
The Supreme Court rejected this approach taken by the D.C.
Circuit. First, the Court concluded that it was not necessary to rule on
whether the Geneva Conventions were judicially enforceable in and
of themselves because Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice ("UCMJ") empowered military commissions to try
individuals for violations of the "laws of war." 25 And, the Court
makes clear, the Geneva Conventions are, "as the Government does

23. Id. at 41-42 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 42.
25. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 (2006). Uniform Code of
Military Justice Article 21, entitled "Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial not Eclusive,"
provides:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do

not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals
of concurrent jurisdiction with respect of offenders or offenses that by statute
or by the law of war may be tried by such military commissions, provost
courts, or other military tribunals.
Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 21, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
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not dispute, part of the law of war. '26 Thus, the UCMJ-a federal
statute-had effectively incorporated the laws of war and thus, the
Geneva Conventions, into domestic law with respect to the
functioning of military commissions.
Second, the Court ruled that irrespective of whether the full
protections of the Geneva Conventions applied to Hamdan, it was
clear that the protections under Common Article 3 did. And the
relevant protection was that "'[t]he passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by
a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."'

27

The

military commissions established by the President's order did not,
the Court ruled, constitute a "regularly constituted court" under
Common Article 3.
In reaching the conclusion that Common Article 3 applied, the
Court explicitly rejected the President's interpretation. The Court
noted that the reference in Common Article 3 to "conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting parties," does not refer only to civil war-as the
Government had argued-but rather to any conflict that is not
between states. The Court explained:
The term "conflict not of an international character" is used
here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations. So
much is demonstrated by the "fundamental logic [of] the
Convention's provisions on its application." [Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d] at 44 (Williams, J., concurring).
Common Article 2 provides that "the present Convention
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties." High Contracting Parties (signatories)
also must abide by all terms of the Conventions vis-A-vis one
another even if one party to the conflict is a nonsignatory
"Power," and must so abide vis-d-vis the nonsignatory if "the
latter accepts and applies" those terms. Common Article 3, by
contrast, affords some minimal protection, falling short of full
protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated
with neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory "Power"
who are involved in a conflict "in the territory of' a
26. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2794.
27. Id. at 2795 (citation omitted).
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signatory. The latter kind of conflict is distinguishable from
the conflict described in Common Article 2 chiefly because it
does not involve a clash between nations (whether signatories
or not). In context, then, the phrase
"not of an international
28
character" bears its literal meaning.
As can be seen from that last sentence, to render this interpretation
the Court first looked to a literal reading of the words of the
Conventions. But it also relied heavily upon several other sources.
The first, and seemingly most important of these, were the
Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions prepared by the
International Committee on the Red Cross. With one commentary
written to correspond to each Geneva Convention, the Court only
cited the Commentaries to the Third (GCIII) 29 and Fourth (GCIV)3 °
Conventions. When the Court introduced the Commentary to Third
Convention in a footnote, it noted "[t]hough not binding law, the
commentary is, as the parties recognize, relevant in interpreting the
Conventions' provisions."31 The Court used these Commentaries
through out the decision to interpret the meaning of the Geneva
Conventions. On the nature of Common Article 3, the Court quoted
the Commentary's definition of "conflict not of an international
character": "'[a] non-international armed conflict is distinct from an
international armed conflict because of the legal status of the entities

28. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795-96 (some internal citations omitted). It is
interesting to note that following this statement, the Court goes on to cite Jeremy
Bentham, famously held to be the originator of the term internationallaw: "See,
e.g., J. Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 6, 296 (J.

Bums & H. Hart eds. 1970) (using the term 'international law' as a 'new though
not inexpressive appellation' meaning 'betwixt nation and nation'; defining
'international' to include 'mutual transactions between sovereigns as such')." Id. at
2796. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2608 (1997) (noting that Bentham coined the term

"inter-national law" in 1789 amidst widespread international discourse on
sovereignty).
29. 3 JEAN

DE PREUX ET AL., INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY:

GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

(Jean

S. Pictet ed., A. P. de Heney trans. 1960).
30. 4

OSCAR

M.

UHLER

ET

AL.,

INT'L

COMM.

OF

THE

RED

CROSS,

COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin & C. W. Dumbleton

trans. 1958).
31. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790 n.48.
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opposing each other."' 32 The Court then proceeded to draw upon the
Commentary to elaborate upon the meaning of non-international
conflict:
Although the official commentaries accompanying Common
Article 3 indicate that an important purpose of the provision
was to furnish minimal protection to rebels involved in one
kind of "conflict not of an international character," i.e., a civil
war, see GCIII Commentary 36-37, the commentaries also
make clear "that the scope of the Article must be as wide as
possible," id., at 36. In fact, limiting language that would
have rendered Common Article 3 applicable "especially [to]
cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion," was
omitted from the final version of the Article, which coupled
broader scope of application with a narrower range of rights
than did earlier proposed iterations. See GCIII Commentary
42-43.33
On this last point, the Court is using the Commentary because it
discusses the "legislative history" of the Geneva Conventions.
In addition to the Commentary, the Court also cited several other
sources to aid it in interpreting Common Article 3. These sources
appeared in footnote 63 of the decision.34 This note is a "see also"
cite that begins with the Court citing the GCIII for the proposition
that "Common Article 3 'has the merit of being simple and clear....
Its observance does not depend upon preliminary discussions on the
nature of the conflict' and then the GCIV for the assertion that
32. Id. at 2796 (citation omitted).
33. Id (alteration in original and footnote omitted).
34. The full text of footnote 63 reads:
See also GCIII Commentary 35 (Common Article 3 "has the merit of being
simple and clear .... Its observance does not depend upon preliminary
discussions on the nature of the conflict"); GCIV Commentary 51 ("[N]obody
in enemy hands can be outside the law"); U.S. Army Judge Advocate
General's Legal Center and School, Dept. of the Army, Law of War
Handbook 144 (2004) (Common Article 3 "serves as a 'minimum yardstick of
protection in all conflicts, not just internal armed conflicts"' (quoting
Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14,
218, 25 I.L.M. 1023));
Prosecutor v. Tadi[c], Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 102 (ICTY App. Chamber, Oct. 2,
1995) (stating that "the character of the conflict is irrelevant" in deciding
whether Common Article 3 applies).
Id.at 2796 n.63.
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"'nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law."' 35 The Court then
cited the Department of the Army Law of War Handbook36 , which
quoted the International Court of Justice's ("ICJ") decision in
Nicaragua v. United States,37 and the decision of the International
38
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia's decision in Prosecutorv. Tadi.&
The Law of War Handbook was cited for the proposition that
"Common Article 3 'serves as a "minimum yardstick of protection in
all conflicts, not just internal armed conflicts""'. 39 The Court then
cited Prosecutor v. Tadi6, for the conclusion that "'the character of
the conflict is irrelevant' in deciding whether Common Article 3
applies."'4 0
C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S DECISION FOR TREATY
INTERPRETATION

In examining the Court's method of interpreting Common Article
3, two important conclusions can be reached. First, it is clear that the
Court was not deferring to the President's interpretation. Despite the
fact that the issue in question related to the President's interpretation
of a treaty dealing with the laws of war-an area which could be
considered to be within the core Article II powers of the President as
commander-in-chief -the Court did not allow the President to have
final interpretive authority. Second, the Court was not particularly
clear with respect to the method it used to interpret the Geneva
Conventions. Unlike some previous cases, the Court did not provide
a clear statement of the process it employs to interpret treaties. And it
seemed to rely quite heavily upon the Commentary to the Geneva
Conventions and fairly little on actual state practice. Given these two
facts, it is clear why the Hamdan Court's interpretation of Common
Article 3 could be troubling. If it rejects the President's interpretation
and fails to clarify its own method, observers might be led to believe
35. Id. (omission and alteration in original).
36.

DEREK GRIMES ET AL., U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL
CTR. & SCH., LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK (Keith E. Puls ed., 2004).

37. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June

27).
38. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995).
39. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796 n.63 (citations omitted).
40. Id. (citations omitted).
41. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
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the Court will interpret treaties on an ad hoc basis with no clear
guidelines serving as a compass. But, as will be discussed in the next
section, the Hamdan decision actually falls with in a well-established
approach to treaty interpretation.

II. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE ON TREATY
INTERPRETATION
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court in Hamdan did not
provide an explicit articulation of its method for treaty interpretation,
an examination of the jurisprudence of the Court in previous cases,
reveals a relatively clear and consistent approach to treaty
interpretation. What is particularly significant about this approach is
that it very closely follows the accepted international approach to
treaty interpretation reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.42
A. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
The generally accepted approach to treaty interpretation under
international law can be found in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties. 43 This "treaty on treaties" has been widely ratified and
while the United States is not a party to the treaty, it has indicated
that it regards the treaty to be reflective of customary international
law. 44 Two principal articles lay out the Convention's approach to
treaty interpretation-Articles 31 and 32. Article 31, entitled
"General Rule of Interpretation," provides:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.
42. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter VCLT].
43. Id. arts. 31-32, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
44. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS pt. III, introductory note (1987).

Moreover, as Professor John Norton Moore noted in 1980, "[a]lthough the United
States has not yet ratified the Vienna Convention, it is generally accepted as
reflective of the customary international law of treaty interpretation." John Norton
Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law

of the Sea, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 77, 88 n.17 (1980) (citation omitted).

2007]

WHO'S AFRAiD OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS?

2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty
shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its
preamble and annexes:
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made
between all the parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty;
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty
and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the
context:
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions;
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation;
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is
established that the parties so intended.45
As can be seen, Article 31 begins with a strong emphasis on a
textual approach to treaty interpretation. First, paragraph I tells the
interpreter to give words their "ordinary meaning" in light of the
treaty's object and purpose, and its context.46 This is quite similar to
the basic rule of statutory interpretation: words are to be given their

45. VCLT, supra note 42, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
46. Id.
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plain and simple meaning.47 Second, paragraph 2 defines context for
purposes of interpretation. Context is to mean the whole of the
treaty-preamble, annexes, etc.-and any other written agreements
or instruments that are agreed to by all the parties. Third, paragraph 3
provides that the interpreter should also take into account,
subsequent agreements made by the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty, subsequent practice by the parties "which
establishes agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation."48
special
Fourth, paragraph 4 provides that words should be given
49
intended.
so
parties
the
that
established
is
it
"if
meanings
What is clear from Article 31 is that the basic approach to treaty
interpretation is heavily textual. To the extent it relies upon sources
other than the text of the treaty, it emphasizes that those other
sources are to be used only if it is established that they reflect
agreement among the parties that the source is to be seen as
providing authoritative interpretive information.
In the Vienna Convention, Article 32 provides further guidance
relating to treaty interpretation. Entitled, "Supplementary Means of
Interpretation," it provides:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty
and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm
the meaning resulting from the application of article 3 1, or to
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to
article 31:
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable.50

47. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 69 (stating that the rule for purposes of
statutory interpretation is that "in the absence of a statutory definition, the
reviewing court. construes. all words according to their common and approved
usage, which may be established by dictionary definitions").
48. VCLT, supra note 42, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
49. Id.
50. Id. art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
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Article 32, in essence, tells the interpreter when to take recourse to
the negotiating history of a treaty provision. While it always allows
the interpreter to use this negotiating history-to confirm the
analysis under Article 31-it seems to give a secondary place to the
exploration of the preparatory work.
B. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON TREATY INTERPRETATION

The Supreme Court has mentioned the Vienna Convention in only
three cases, and only once in a majority opinion- Weinberger v.
Rossi." In that 1982 case, the Court cited the Convention for
purposes of gleaning the international legal definition of the word
"treaty." In the other two cases, the citation to the Vienna
Convention can be found in the dissents. In his dissent in SanchezLlamas v. Oregon in 2006, Justice Breyer cited the provision of the
Convention relating to the relationship between domestic law and
treaty obligations." Only in Justice Blackmun's dissent in Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council from 1993, was there a reference to the
Vienna Convention's approach to treaty interpretation. 3 In that case,
Blackmun was attempting to find the meaning of several terms found
in the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and noted that "[i]t is well settled that a treaty must first be construed
according to its 'ordinary meaning,"' 5 4 with the citation following
this sentence to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.
But despite the lack of specific references to the Vienna
Convention, there does seem to be a reasonably well-established
approach to treaty interpretation that is remarkably consistent with

51. 456 U.S. 25, 30 n.5 (1982). Specifically, the Court refers to Article 2 of the
Vienna Convention for the definition of "treaty." Id. at 29.
52. 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2691-92 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Article 36
of the Vienna Convention which affords nationals the right to communicate with
their state's consular officers when they are arrested in a foreign country). Justice
Breyer discusses section 2 of Article 36, which states that the right of consular
communication "shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of
the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and
regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights
accorded under this Article are intended." Id. at 2692 (citation omitted).
53. 509 U.S. 155, 191, 195 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
660 U.N.T.S. 267).
54. Id. at 191 (citation omitted).
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the method set forth in Articles 31 and 32 of the Convention. Indeed,
over the course of the years, the Court has developed a methodology
for interpreting international agreements that consists of several
steps.
First, the Court looks to the text of the treaty, giving words their
"ordinary meaning." In the 1985 case of Air France v. Saks, for
example, the Court noted that "[t]he analysis must begin, however,
with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words
are used. 5 5 In Maximov v. United States, the Court looked at56
"normal word use," and "plain language" in interpreting the text.
United States v. Stuart notes a presumption in favor of the clear
language of the text: "'The clear import of treaty language controls
unless "application of the words of the treaty according to their
obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or
expectations of its signatories."' 57 As a guide to determining the
meaning of the words, the Court has also made clear that recourse
should be had to relevant standards of international law. In 1890, in
De Geofroy v. Riggs, the Court noted:
It is a general principle of construction, with respect to
treaties, that they shall be liberally construed, so as to carry
out the apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and
reciprocity between them. As they are contracts between
independent nations, in their construction, words are to be
taken in their ordinary meaning, as understood in the public
law of nations, and not in any artificial or special sense
impressed upon them by local law, unless such restricted
sense is clearly intended.58

55. 470 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1985) (citation omitted). The approach to beginning
with the text was reaffirmed in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 53435 (1991):
"When interpreting a treaty, we 'begin "with the text of the treaty and the
context in which the written words are used .... Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschafi v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988), quoting Soci&t
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S.
522, 534 (1987), quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. at 397.
56. 373 U.S. 49, 52-54 (1963).
57. 489 U.S. 353, 365-66 (1989) (citation omitted).
58. 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890).
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In 1931, in Santovincenzo v. Egan, the Court reaffirmed this
approach, noting that "[a]s treaties are contracts between
independent nations, their words are to be taken in their ordinary
meaning 'as understood in the public law of nations."' 5 9
Second, the Court then takes recourse to the travauxpr~paratoires
and the circumstances surrounding the treaty's conclusion. In 1943,
the Supreme Court explained in Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United
States that: "treaties are construed more liberally than private
agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the
written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the
practical construction adopted by the parties."6 More recently, in
Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines in 1996, Justice Scalia, writing for
the Court, noted:
Because a treaty ratified by the United States is not only the
law of this land, see U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, but also an
agreement among sovereign powers, we have traditionally
considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiating and
the
drafting
history
(travaux pr~paratoires) and
postratification understanding of the contracting parties.6 '
In Rocca v. Thompson, the Court explained that treaties "are to be
read in the light of the conditions and circumstances existing at the
time they were entered into, with a view to effecting the objects and
' 62
purposes of the states thereby contracting.
Third, the Court looks to the "post-ratification" practice of states.
As noted above, Choctow Nation, Zicherman, and Air France
specifically refer to the practice of the parties.6 3 In United States v.
59. 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) (quoting De Geofroy, 133 U.S. at 271).
60. 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943) (citing Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S.
276, 294-95 (1933); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 112 (1933)).
61. 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996).
62. 223 U.S. 317, 331-32 (1912) (citation omitted). At issue in Rocca was a
1878 treaty between Italy and the United States that granted consular officers the
authority to intervene in the administration of a citizen's estate when the individual
died intestate in a foreign country. Id. at 325-26. In interpreting the treaty
provision at issue, the Court looked beyond the treaty's language and considered
an 1894 correspondence between then Italian Ambassador and U.S. Acting
Secretary of State and an 1865 "statement of the law" by the Argentine
Conferederation. Id. at 333.
63. See Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 225-26; Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 403
(1985); Choctaw Nation, 318 U.S. at 431-32.
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Stuart the Court explained "[t]he practice of treaty signatories counts
as evidence of the treaty's proper interpretation, since their conduct
generally evinces their understanding of the agreement they
signed."' 64 To determine "post-ratification practice," the Court looks
to actual practice of the political arms of states parties. For example,
in United States v. Alvarez-Machain,6 5 the Court discussed the way
in which the Mexican Government responded to questions about the
Extradition Treaty 66 between the United States and Mexico.
The Court has also looked to decisions of domestic courts of
parties to the international agreement to determine post-ratification
practice. In Air France, the Court sought to interpret the word
"accident" used in the Warsaw Convention, noting that "[r]eference
to the conduct of the parties to the Convention and the subsequent
interpretations of the signatories helps clarify the meaning of the
term. '6 After looking at political acts by the signatories, the Court
noted that "[i]n determining precisely what causes can be considered
accidents, we 'find the opinions of our sister signatories to be entitled
to considerable weight."' 68 The Court then looked to the decision of a
French court to assist in its interpretation. Even Justice Scalia, who
has rejected the notion that decisions of non-American courts should
be used to interpret the U.S. Constitution, noted in his dissent in
Olympic Airways v. Husain, that is it quite proper to use foreign
court opinions in interpreting international agreements:
We can, and should, look to decisions of other signatories
when we interpret treaty provisions. Foreign constructions are
evidence of the original shared understanding of the
contracting parties. Moreover, it is reasonable to impute to
the parties an intent that their respective courts strive to
interpret the treaty consistently. . . . Finally, even if we
disagree, we surely owe the conclusions reached by appellate

64. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989) (citations omitted).

65. See 504 U.S. 655, 665-66 (1992) (discussing the Mexican Government's
failure to request the inclusion of a clause in the United States-Mexico Extradition
Treaty that would have precluded each state from abducting the other's citizens for
criminal prosecution, where the Mexican Government knew before and after it
ratified the Treaty, that the U.S. government permitted such abductions).
66. Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Mex., May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059.
67. Air France,470 U.S. at 403.
68. Id. at 404 (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913,
919 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979)).
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courts of other signatories
consideration.69

729

the courtesy of respectful

Interestingly enough, the Court has also been willing to examine
decisions by the international courts in assisting it in seeking the
meaning of treaties. As far back as 1957, Justice Frankfurter cited the
ICJ to interpret a treaty provision in Reid v. Covert.70 More recently,
the Court has noted in Sanchez-Llamas that a decision of the ICJ
would be entitled "to the 'respectful consideration' due an
interpretation of an international agreement by an international
court.

' 71

The Court, however, emphasized in this case that the ICJ

decision would seem to have no binding effect on the courts of the
United States.72

69. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660-61 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
70. 354 U.S. 1, 61 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The word 'disputes'
has been interpreted by the International Court of Justice to comprehend criminal
as well as civil disputes.") (citation omitted).
71. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2685 (2006). However, the
Court also stated that a treaty's plain import overcomes the "respectful
consideration" accorded to the ICJ's interpretation. Id.
72. The Court explained:
Nothing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its interpretations
were intended to be conclusive on our courts. The ICJ's decisions have "no
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular
case," Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 59, 59 Stat. 1062, T.
S. No. 993 (1945) (emphasis added). Any interpretation of law the ICJ
renders in the course of resolving particular disputes is thus not binding
precedent even as to the ICJ itsef, there is accordingly little reason to think
that such interpretations were intended to be controlling on our courts. The
ICJ's principal purpose is to arbitrate particular disputes between national
governments. Id., at 1055 (ICJ is "the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations"); see also Art. 34, id., at 1059 ("Only states [i.e., countries] may be
parties in cases before the Court"). While each member of the United Nations
has agreed to comply with decisions of the ICJ "in any case to which it is a
party," United Nations Charter, Art. 94(1), 59 Stat. 1051, T.S. No. 933
(1945), the Charter's procedure for noncompliance-referral to the Security
Council by the aggrieved state-contemplates quintessentially international
remedies, Art. 94(2), ibid.
Id. at 2684-85 (footnote omitted).
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III. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SEPARATION
OF POWERS
The decision by the Supreme Court in Hamdan-especiallywhen
coupled with the Court's historic approach to treaty interpretationhas significant implications for the roles of the President and
Congress in the interpretation process.
To begin with, Hamdan makes it extraordinarily clear that the
final word on treaty interpretation comes from the Judiciary. As
noted earlier, despite the fact that the case dealt with the
interpretation of a treaty that discussed issues relating to the conduct
of war-presumably an area that is core to the President's authority
as commander-in-chief-the Supreme Court did not simply defer to
the President's interpretation of Common Article 3. And, as
Professor Carlos Vazquez has noted, the implications of Hamdan for
treaty interpretation are even more significant in light of the decision
issued by the Court the day before Hamdan.7 3 In Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, the Supreme Court was required to interpret the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations.7 4 Faced with a decision of the
International Court of Justice purporting to provide one interpretation
of the Convention, the Court made a very clear statement about the
role of the Judiciary in interpreting international agreements. Writing
for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts explained:
Under our Constitution, "[t]he judicial Power of the United
States" is "vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." Art. III, § 1. That "judicial Power ... extend[s] to
. . . Treaties." Id., § 2. And, as Chief Justice Marshall
famously explained, that judicial power includes the duty "to
say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison. If treaties are to be
given effect as federal law under our legal system,
determining their meaning as a matter of federal law "is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department," headed by the "one supreme Court" established
73. See Carlos Vdzquez, Hamdan and the Geneva Conventions, (June 30,
2006),
http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown-university-law/2006/06/hamdan-and-the_
.html (emphasis added); see also infra text accompanying note 90.
74. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,

596 U.N.T.S. 261.
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by the Constitution. Ibid.; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 378-379, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000)
(opinion of Stevens, J.) ("At the core of [the judicial] power
responsibilityindependent
is the federal courts'
independent from its coequal branches in the Federal
Government, and independent from the separate authority of
the several States-to interpret federal law"). It is against this
background that the United States ratified, and the Senate
gave its advice and consent to, the various agreements 75that
govern referral of Vienna Convention disputes to the ICJ.
The Court could not be clearer in indicating that it has the
Constitutional duty to interpret all federal law-including treaties.
Moreover, the last sentence in the passage above is especially
important. Here the Court seems to indicate that when the United
States ratifies a treaty and the Senate gives advice and consent, this
takes place with the understanding that the courts have a role in the
treaty's interpretation. In other words, the Court seems to be
suggesting that by making a treaty the "law of the land," the political
branches of government are thereby deferring to the Judiciary the
right of interpretation.
From this conclusion, one can draw several even more specific
inferences for the separation of powers. First, the so-called "common
understanding" of a treaty's interpretation that was shared by the
President and the Senate at the time of ratification is not binding
upon the courts.
During the early 1980's a significant controversy about treaty
interpretation emerged in the wake of President Ronald Reagan's
efforts to "re-interpret" 76 the Antiballistic Missile ("ABM") Treaty
of 1972.11 At issue was whether the ABM Treaty permitted the
75. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2684 (some internal citations omitted).
76. For an overview of the ABM Treaty reinterpretation controversy, see
Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, Testing and Development of 'Exotic'
Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1956 (1986); Kevin C. Kennedy, Treaty Interpretation by the Executive
Branch: The ABM Treaty and "Star Wars" Testing and Development, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L 854 (1986); Abraham D. Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic
Defense Initiative, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1972 (1986); Symposium, Arms Control
Treaty Reinterpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1351 (1989).
77. Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May
26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435.
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development of space-based ABM systems if they were based on
"other physical principles. 78 While the negotiation record of the
Treaty seemed to be unclear on this question, many argued that when
the Senate was considering the Treaty, Administration officials made
representations to the Senate that indicated that such systems could
not be developed.7 9 As a consequence, it seemed to some that there

was a "common understanding" that both the Senate and the
Executive Branch held. When the Reagan Administration came into
office, however, a variety of officials began to "re-interpret" the
Treaty. These persons went back to the negotiating record and
reached the conclusion that even if the Senate and President Nixon
had indeed accepted the interpretation that such systems were not
permitted, the Soviet Union never did.8" Thus, because there had
never been a meeting of the minds of the two treaty partners as to
this restriction, the parties were free to develop space-based systems
based on "other physical principles."
This "re-interpretation" by the Administration so perturbed many
members of Congress that when the Senate was giving advice and
consent to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Missile Treaty ("INF
Treaty"),8" the Senate imposed a condition requiring the Executive
78. See Kennedy, supra note 76, at 861 (stating that "other physical principles"
is the term of art used in the ABM Treaty to describe systems "such as lasers and

particle beams").
79. See id. at 864 (quoting Senator James Buckley, who testified against
adopting the ABM Treaty at the Senate hearing and stated that the ABM Treaty

has the "effect ... of prohibiting the development and testing of a laser-type
system based in space"). The Senate hearings reached two conclusions, "first, that
when Article III, paragraph 1 of Article V and Agreed Statement D are read

together, their import is that the development and testing of 'Star Wars' technology
in any basing mode other than a fixed, land-based mode is prohibited; and second,
that the deployment of such technology in even the fixed, land-based mode is

prohibited under the Treaty." Id. at 862-66.
80. See, e.g., Charlotte Saikowski, U.S. Grapples with ABM Definitions,

Oct. 17, 1985, at 1 (providing that Assistant
Secretary of Defense Richard N. Perle revisited the ABM Treaty's negotiating
records to conclude that "[a]fter one wades through all the ambiguities and reads
carefully the text of the treaty itself and the negotiating record.., with respect to
systems based on 'other physical principles'-such as lasers and directed-energy
weapons-we have the legal right under the treaty to conduct research and
development and testing unlimited by the terms of the treaty").
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,

81. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles, U.S.-U.S.S.R., arts. 1-17, Dec. 8, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-11
(1988).

2007]

WHO'S AFRAID OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS?

733

Branch to interpret the Treaty in accordance with the "common
understanding." The condition-sometimes called the Biden
Condition8 2 -states:
(1) Provided, that the Senate's advice and consent to
ratification of the INF Treaty is subject to the condition,
based on the Treaty Clauses of the Constitution, that(A) the United States shall interpret the Treaty in
accordance with the common understanding of the
Treaty shared by the President and the Senate at the
time the Senate gave its advice and consent to
ratification;
(B) such common understanding is based on:
(i) first, the text of the Treaty and the provisions of
this resolution of ratification; and
(ii) second, the authoritative representations which
were provided by the President and his
representatives to the Senate and its Committees,
in seeking Senate consent to ratification, insofar
as such representations were directed to the
meaning and legal effect of the text of the Treaty;
and
(C) the United States shall not agree to or adopt an
interpretation different from that common
understanding except pursuant to Senate advice and
82. See Gary M. Buechler, Constitutional Limits on the President's Power to
Interpret Treaties: The Sofaer Doctrine, the Biden Condition, and the Doctrine of
Binding Authoritative Representations, 78 GEO. L.J. 1983, 1990-97 (1990)
(discussing the Biden Condition and its three criteria for binding the Executive
branch to its former representations about a treaty's meaning made during the
Senate advice and consent process). The three criteria are: (1) the statements must
have been by persons "authorized to speak for the Executive on that particular
[treaty] subject"; (2) only statements "'directed to the meaning and legal effect of
the text of the Treaty' are binding on the Executive; and (3) the Executive must
have represented "only one meaning" for the treaty or treaty provision at issue. Id.
at 1990-95 (footnotes omitted).
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consent to a subsequent treaty or protocol, or the
enactment of a statute; and
(D) if, subsequent to ratification of the Treaty, a question
arises as to the interpretation of a provision of the
Treaty on which no common understanding was
reached in accordance with paragraph (2), that
provision shall be interpreted in accordance with
applicable United States law.83
In the wake of the ABM Treaty controversy this reservation
certainly seemed to make sense. The Senate did not want a treaty to
be presented to it with a particular meaning only to have that
Administration or a subsequent one come back and "discover" a true
meaning of the treaty that was at variance with what was generally
understood when the Senate voted on the treaty. But Hamdan,
Sanchez-Llamas, and indeed the general practice of the courts would
seem to indicate rather clearly that while such common
understanding
would
presumably
be
given
"respectful
consideration," it would not be binding on the courts.
Interestingly enough President Reagan seemed to acknowledge the
role of the Judiciary as the final arbiter of interpretation. Following
the Senate's vote on the INF Treaty, Reagan issued a statement
expressing his concern with the Senate's reservation. He argued that
"[t]he Senate condition relating to the Treaty Clauses of the
Constitution apparently seeks to alter the law of treaty
interpretation. 8 4 Explaining that, "[tireaties are agreements between
sovereign states and must be interpreted in accordance with accepted
principles of international law and United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence,"8 the President noted:
This Administration does not take the position that the
Executive branch can disregard authoritative Executive
statements to the Senate, and we have no intention of
83. 134 CONG. REc. S6876, S6937 (daily ed. May 27, 1988) (Executive session
on the INF Treaty).
84. President's Message to the Senate on the Soviet-United States
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 779
(June 10, 1988).
85. Id.
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changing the interpretation of the INF Treaty which was
presented to the Senate. On the contrary, this Administration
has made it clear that it will consider all such authoritative
statements as having been made in good health. Nonetheless
the principles of treaty interpretation recognized and
repeatedly invoked by the courts may not be limited or
changed by the Senate alone, and those principles will govern
any future disputes over interpretation of this Treaty. As
Senator [Richard G.] Lugar pointed out during the debate, the
Supreme Court may well have the final judgment, which
would be binding on the Presidentand Senate alike.86
A second implication that can be drawn from the Hamdan decision
is that it seems unlikely that Congress can impose by statute a
particular interpretation on a treaty. The case of Haver v. Yaker
suggests that the Senate could, through adopting a reservation,
impose a specific interpretation on a treaty as a part of the
ratification process. " But Congressional efforts to impose direct
interpretations by statute outside of the advice-and-consent process
would not seem to be dispositive on the courts. If, as the Supreme
Court has consistently ruled, a treaty is an agreement among
sovereign states and those states' understandings of the treaty are
critical for interpretation, the unilateral effort by U.S. Congress
would not in and of itself be authoritative. This would mean the
Military Commissions Act, insofar as it purports to impose an
interpretation, would not be binding on the courts.
Clearly this view has been debated in the wake of the Military
Commissions Act. Professor Julian Ku, for example, noted the
following in connection with an earlier legislative proposal:
I am not aware of other examples where Congress has
reversed a Court's interpretation of a treaty, but there is zero
doubt in my mind that this move is constitutional. Congress
has the authority to nullify the domestic effect of treaties via
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. 32, 35 (1869) (affirming that the Senate can

impose a reservation upon a treaty, which upon the treaty's ratification becomes
binding as U.S. law). "In this country, a treaty is something more than a contract,
for the Federal Constitution declares it to be the law of the land. If so, before it can
become law, the Senate, in whom rests the authority to ratify it, must agree to it.
But the Senate are not required to adopt or reject it as a whole, but may modify or
amend it .... Id.
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the "last in time rule" and this authority almost certainly
includes the power to adopt a binding interpretation of a
treaty for domestic purposes as well. In other words,
Congress might be adopting an incorrect interpretation of
Common Article 3, but its "incorrect" interpretation
is still
8
binding as a matter of domestic U.S. law.
Hamdan, Sanchez-Llamas, and the record of Supreme Court
jurisprudence .seem to suggest that Ku is wrong. It is true that under
the Supreme Court's decision in Whitney v. Robertson-which has
been reaffirmed in many other cases-when there is a conflict
between a treaty and a federal statute, the court will try to interpret
them in such a way as to give effect to both, but if that is not
possible, the one enacted later in time will prevail. 89 But that seems
to require that the treaty say "X" and the statute say "Not X." For
example, if a treaty said "the death penalty is hereby prohibited in
cases of persons under eighteen years of age," and the statute said
"the death penalty is not prohibited in cases of persons under
eighteen years of age," the latter in time-whether the statute or the
treaty-would prevail. But if Congress by statute says a treaty- to
which the United States is a party must be interpretedin a particular
way, it seems unlikely the courts will accept that interpretation. As
Carlos Vdzquez has pointed out:
It is true that, under the last-in-time rule, Congress and the
President can legislate in contravention of a treaty obligation.
But it is significant that, in a decision on Wednesday [June
28, 2006], Sanchez-Llamas v.Oregon, the Court relied on
Article III of the Constitution and quoted Marbury v.
Madison in holding that it is the province and duty of the
Supreme Court to interpret treaties. The Court gave that as a
reason why the interpretation of another treaty by the
International Court of Justice could not be considered
binding, but presumably this analysis also makes the
Supreme Court the authoritative interpreter of treaties vis-avis the President and even Congress. If so, then the Court's
analysis in Sanchez-Llamas rules out a statute that purports to
reject the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Geneva
88. Julian Ku, Why Congress Can Override the Supreme Court's Interpretation

of

International

Law,

Opinio

Juris,

(Sept.

http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/157605434.shtml.
89. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888).
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Convention and "restore" the President's interpretation, as
Professor John Yoo has urged Congress to do. The lawmakers could, of course, repeal the Geneva Convention's
domestic effect, but, in light of Sanchez-Llamas, they would
have to do so by openly rejecting the Geneva Convention.
Openly rejecting the Geneva Conventions would of course be
a terrible idea, given the protections they provide to our
troops. I assume (and hope) that such repudiation is not
within the range of plausible options. If Congress is
powerless to reject the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
treaty, and repudiation of the treaty is not conceivable, then
any legislative solution would have to comply with the
Supreme Court's interpretationof Common Article 3.9
A third implication of the Supreme Court's approach to treaty
interpretation is that Congress could not tell the Court to exclude
certain sources from its efforts to interpret a treaty. As noted earlier,
the Military Commissions Act sought to impose a certain statutory
interpretation on the Geneva Conventions, but it also sought to
instruct the courts not to consider certain sources in the process of
treaty interpretation--domestic courts in other countries and
international courts.
Needless to say, there has been a great debate about the use of socalled "foreign court" decisions in U.S. courts. 91 And while the use
of non-American courts ruling in efforts to interpret the U.S.
Constitution has met with strong criticism from some members of the
bench-especially Justice Scalia, 91 the use of non-American court
decisions to interpret treaties has not. As noted above, Justice Scalia
has applied such court rulings to interpret treaties. 93 Recently, in an
address at the American Enterprise Institute, Scalia noted:
90. Vdzquez, supra note 73 (emphasis added).
91. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, When is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing
More?: Unpacking the Controversy Over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S.
Law, 90 MiNN. L. REv. 1275, 1278-1302 (2006) (discussing theory-based,

irrelevance, expressivist, and quality-control criticism when dealing with non-U.S.
law in constitutional interpretation).
92. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Court's use of foreign case law and noting that "[t]he
Court's discussion of these foreign views . . . is therefore meaningless dicta.
Dangerous dicta, however, since 'this Court... should not impose foreign moods,

fads, or fashions on Americans"') (citation omitted).
93. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) (providing
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So, moreover, I do not take the position that foreign law is
never, ever relevant to American judicial opinions. It
sometimes is. For example, in the interpretation of treaties,
the object of a treaty is to have nations agree on a particular
course of action. If I'm interpreting a provision of a treaty
that has already been interpreted by several other signatories,
I am inclined to follow the interpretation taken by those other
signatories so long as it's within the realm of reasonableness.
I mean, if they've taken an absolutely unreasonable
interpretation, of course I wouldn't follow it. But where it's
within the bounds of the ambiguity contained in the text, I
think it's a good practice to look to what other signatories to
the treaty have said. Otherwise you're going to have a treaty
that's interpreted different ways by different countries and
that's certainly not the object of the exercise.94
Scalia even indicated that it would be proper to use foreign decisions
to interpret a federal statute that related to the treaty. He explained:
I also think that foreign law is sometimes relevant to the
meaning of an American Statute. For example, if the Statute
is designed to implement a treaty provision, the interpretation
of that treaty provision by foreign courts is relevant to what
the treaty means, and hence, relevant to what the provision of
the American Statute implementing the treaty means.95
Given the comments by Scalia and the Court's jurisprudence on this
question, it would seem clear that efforts, like the Military
Commission Act, to tell courts that they cannot use a "foreign or
international source of law" as "a basis for a rule of decision in the
courts of the United States" '96 in interpreting the Military
Commission Act's interpretation of the Geneva Conventions would
likely be rejected by the Supreme Court.
Justice Scalia's opinion for a unanimous Court and stating that since a ratified
treaty is U.S. law as well as an agreement among nation states, the Court has
"traditionally considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiating and drafting
history (travaux preparatoires) and the postratification understanding of the
contracting parties.").
94. Justice Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address at the Conference on Outsourcing
of American Law, American Enterprise Institute (Feb. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.aei.org/events/filter.,eventlD. 1256/transcript.asp.
95. Id.
96. Military Commissions Act § 6(a)(2).

2007]

WHO'S AFRAID OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS?

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the preceding analysis, several points seem to be quite
clear. First, when it comes to interpreting treaties, the courts-not the
President, not the Congress-have the final word-at least when
cases are presented for judicial resolution.9 7 Second, even though the
Hamdan decision did not lay out a detailed method for interpreting
treaties, prior case law makes it clear that the Supreme Court will
follow a procedure remarkably similar to that provided in Articles 31
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Based on these conclusions, the Executive and Legislative
branches should take notice: once a treaty has been made and
ratified, they no longer have control over its interpretation. This
means that as the President negotiates treaties and as the Senate gives
advice and consent, political decision-makers should be aware of
steps that they can take to insure that treaties will be given the
interpretation that they intend. Here are some recommendations:
0 For future treaty negotiations:
o

First, the political branches should make every effort to define
terms in the treaty text itself. It is not unusual for treaties to
contain explicit provisions that provide definitions of terms or
other concepts. 98 If this is done, it will be less likely that a

97. Needless to say, there may have been many treaty interpretation
controversies where the matter never reaches the courts. The interpretation
questions relating to the ABM Treaty, for example, never got to the judiciary.
98. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide art. 2, Dec. 9, 1949, S. Treaty Doc. No. 81-15 (1986), 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
280 (defining "genocide" as "any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, such as:
(a) [k]illing members of the group; (b) [c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (c) [d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) [i]mposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) [f]orcibly transferring
children of the group to another group"); CAT, supra note 13, art. 1, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 113-14 (defining "torture" as "any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity"); VCLT, supra note 42, art. 2, 1155
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court will misinterpret provisions of the treaty. Needless to
say, there are times when the negotiators may wish to have
ambiguities in the treaty for a variety of political reasons. 99
There should certainly be no hard and fast rule against such
ambiguities, but the negotiators should always bear in mind
that in the future a court may not rule the same way on those
provisions as the drafters might have originally desired.
o

Second, the negotiators should make on-record comments
about the meaning of the agreement. These statements should
be made during the negotiating process and during the
ratification process. The more information that has been
placed in the travaux, the more data the court will have to rely
upon when it provides its interpretation.

o Third, if after the treaty negotiations have concluded and the
political branches are still concerned about the interpretation
of certain provisions of the agreement, the Senate could
through a so-called "RUD" (reservation, understanding, or
declaration) stipulate a particular interpretation. As noted
earlier, under Haver v. Yaker, such an interpretation imposed
by the Senate as part of the advice and consent process would
presumably be binding on the courts.100 This approach,
however, would have numerous disadvantages, not the least of
which is that the other treaty parties could conclude that the
United States was seeking effectively to change the text after
the negotiations had ended. As a consequence, I would
recommend that RUDs imposing interpretations be used with
great caution.
o

Fourth, another option for the political branches during the
advice and consent process would be for the Senate to

U.N.T.S. at 333 (creating a list of definitions as one of the first provisions in the
Treaty and providing definitions for terms like "treaty," "ratification," "full

powers," and "international organization").
99. See Christine Bell & Kathleen Cavanaugh, "Constructive Ambiguity" Or
Internal Self-Determination? Self-Determination, Group Accommodation and the
Belfast Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1345, 1356 (1999) ("Constructive

ambiguity is a classic maneuver when agreeing on a hotly-disputed text."). "Actors
deliberately adopt language that is vague and can, simultaneously, mean different
things to different people." Id.
100See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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stipulate through an RUD that the agreement as a whole or
certain provisions of the agreement were non-selfexecuting.' 0 ' Although there is some debate on this issue, such
an RUD would seem to prevent courts from reaching
interpretation questions about the agreement or those specific
provisions.' ° 2 But even more so than with RUDs that impose
specific interpretations on an agreement, RUDs that make a
treaty, or portions thereof, non-self-executing have significant
disadvantages. It might appear to our treaty partners that the
United States was not fully committed to its international
obligations under the agreement and that we were, in essence,
acting in bad faith. Accordingly, I believe that such RUDs
03
should be used only in extraordinary cases, if at all. 1
o

Fifth, because postratification practice can also be a guide for
court decisions, the Executive Branch should very carefully
monitor the way in which other states act-both in court
decisions and in the behavior of their executive branches. If a
state seems to be behaving in a manner that is contrary to the
interpretation of the agreement that the American negotiators

'0' A "self-executing" treaty is one that is immediately effective in the U.S.
domestic legal system without the need for statutory implementation. See Carlos
Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrinesof Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 695, 695 (1995) (footnote omitted) ("At a general level, a self-executing treaty
may be defined as a treaty that may be enforced in the courts without prior
legislation by Congress, and a non-self-executing treaty, conversely, as a treaty
that may not be enforced in the courts without prior legislative "implementation.")
102 In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court seemed to acknowledge the
ability of an RUD to establish that treaty provisions are non-self-executing and
thus prevent courts from interpreting those provisions. 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004)
("Several times, indeed, the Senate has expressly declined to give the federal
courts the task of interpreting and applying international human rights law, as
when its ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
declared that the substantive provisions of the document were not self-executing.")
For a more extensive discussion of the arguments surrounding this use of RUDs,
see Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Military Commissions Act of 2006: The Military
Commissions Act, the Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A CriticalGuide, 101
AM. J. INT'L L. 73, 90-91 (2007) which discusses the scholarly debate about the
effect of RUDs that seek to make treaties or portions thereof non-self-executing.
103 1 want to thank Professor Carlos Vdzquez for bringing this potential use of
RUDs to my attention. Neither Professor Vdzquez nor I are advocates of this use of
RUDs.
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intended, then U.S. officials should go on record to indicate
that disagreement.
* For prior treaties:
If there are provisions in treaties that have been previously
negotiated and ratified, the Executive branch cannot go back in time
and construct a negotiation history. But it can take other measures:
o First, the Executive branch could seek to negotiate formal
amendments or additional protocols to existing agreements
that would establish the definition of certain terms. Take but
one example: as noted earlier, much of the current controversy
relates to the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to
armed conflicts involving non-state actors such as al Qaeda.' °
Instead of trying to determine what the drafters of those
Conventions would have done had they have been able to
envision the world of Twenty-First Century conflict, it would
make more sense to draft new Conventions that could more
clearly address the nature of contemporary international
conflict.
104. Of course groups like al Qaeda are only one of the many non-state actors
that are playing roles in international conflict. Private contractors and security
firms have been proliferating and are now intimately involved in many aspects of
armed combat. And a multiplicity of non-governmental organizations are also
engaged in dealing various aspects of armed conflict. See generally Win. C. Peters,
On Law, Wars, and Mercenaries: The Case for Courts-MartialJurisdiction Over
Civilian ContractorMisconduct in Iraq, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REv. 367, 367-69, 41314 (noting the expanding participation of civilian contractors in U.S. military
operations and arguing that military courts-martial is the preferred jurisdiction for
such contractors who commit war crimes); Daniel Bergner, The Other Army, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Aug. 14, 2005, at 29 (discussing the roles of various private security
companies in Iraq, such as protecting government buildings, guarding corporate
contractors working on Iraq's reconstruction, and defending people likely to be
targeted by insurgents); Jonathan Finer, Security Contractors in Iraq Under
Scrutiny After Shootings, WASH. POST, Sep. 10, 2005, at Al (observing that
foreign security contractors working in Iraq may be undermining relations between
foreign military forces and Iraqi civilians); Nathan Hodge, Army Chief Notes
'Problematic' Potential of Armed Contractors on the Battlefield, DEF. DAILY,
Sept. 9, 2005 (stating that Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker suggested
that the use of private contractors raises important "issues of command and
control"); David Washburn & Bruce V. Bigelow, In Harm's Way: Titan in Iraq;
Workers say 'Wild West' Conditions Put Lives in Danger, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., July 24, 2005, at Al (stating that Operation Iraqi Freedom has experimented
with outsourcing "many of the behind-the-lines support functions," but due to the
increasing insurgency, "the lines between warriors and civilians" have blurred).
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Second-and this is the more extreme step-Congress could
enact legislation that is clearly contrary to the agreement.
Under the principle of Whitney v. Robertson, when there is a
conflict between a treaty and a federal statute, if the two
cannot be reconciled, the latter in time will prevail.'0 5 Note: I
am not suggesting that Congress attempt to impose a statutory
interpretationof terms of a treaty-which is what the Military
Commission Act seeks to do. As noted earlier, given the case
law, the courts are likely to say that no interpretation that
Congress seeks to impose on the Courts would be binding on
the courts. Rather, I am suggesting that if Congress is truly
concerned about the way a certain treaty provision will be
interpreted, Congress needs to adopt legislation clearly
contradictingthat provision.
As noted above, this is truly an extreme step and, in my view,
should be undertaken only in exceptional circumstances. Even
though as a matter of domestic law, the subsequent statute
would prevail, the United States would be in violation of its
international obligation under the treaty and would suffer
potentially adverse consequences on the international plane.

In sum, treaties in the United States enjoy a dual role. They create
both international law and U.S. domestic law. Insofar as cases
present themselves in U.S. courts, the Supreme Court has made it
clear that the courts will be the final authority on treaty
interpretation. Rather than attempting to fight against the courts,
policy makers should accept this reality of the judicial role and work
in the future to craft treaties in such a way that the true intent of the
parties will be given effect by American courts.

105. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888).

